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THE INFLICTION OF ILLEGITIMACY:
A NEW TORT?
A new tort allowing an action by an infant for damages for
her negligently caused illegitimacy may have been created in
the 1965 New York Court of Claims case of Williams v State.' In
that case an action was brought by Frank Williams as guardian
ad Litem for Christine Williams, an infant under the age of fourteen
years, against the State of New York alleging neglectful care and
supervision over the mother, Lorene Williams, while a mental patient
in the custody of the defendant in Manhattan State Hospital, which
neglectful care and supervision allowed the mother to be sexually
assaulted, and that as a result of that negligence the infant,
Christine Williams, was conceived and born out of wedlock to a
mentally deficient mother The pleading of the plaintiff alleges
damages resulting from deprivation of property rights, normal child-
hood and home life, proper parental care, support and rearing,
and from having to bear the stigma of illegitimacy 2 Acting only
on the question of the plaintiff's pleading, the Court of Claims,
recognizing the breach of a foreseeable duty as the proximate
cause of damages to the plaintiff,8 determined that the cause of
action was maintainable.'
On appeal by the state from the Court of Claims decision to
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department,
that decision was reversed5 for lack of a "reasonable basis, con-
sistent with public policy" for recognizing the tort, because, the
1. 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965).
2. The mother, through Frank Williams, her guardian, also pleaded a seperate cause
of action in this case, for carnal assault while a mental patient In the custody of the State,
resulting in the pregnancy and birth allegedly due to the State's Insufficient care and
supervision, but the State did not here attack the legal sufficiency of the cause of action
in favor of the mother, but only that In favor of the child. The plaintiff prays $50,000.00
for the mother's cause of action, and $100,000.00 for the infant Christine. Id., 260 N.Y.S.2d
at 954.
3. "[The act or acts of which the infant complains were reasonably foreseeable by
the State which owed a duty to its patient and her issue. Where a pleading alleges that
a breach of a foreseeable duty was a prortmate cause of damages, a claimant should be
entitled to a trial." Id., 260 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
4. "Being compelled to accept the pleaded facts as true, it is my determination that
the cause of action sub Judice is maintainable. Assuming that the defendant did not give
a female mental patient adequate care and supervision at a hospital so that she was not
prevented from being sexually attacked, the forseeable combination of persons and event
is actionable negligence and a proximate cause of the pregnancy and birth." Id., 260
N.Y.S.2d at 955.
5. Williams v. State, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966).
6. Id. at 787.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Appellate division felt, the damages are impossible to ascertain.7
Denials of recovery based upon a fear that the law cannot put
a monetary value upon the interest m question have impeded the
development of other areas of tort law, notably that of mental
distress.8 Refusal to recognize that tort for reason of difficulty
of assessment of damages, proved merely a temporary deterrent
to eventual recognition of the tort, once its elements had been
defined and analyzed. 9
In reaching its decision, the Court of Claims followed closely
the reasoning in, and quoted extensively from, the 1963 Illinois
case of Zepeda v Zepeda,10 a somewhat similar case in which
relief was denied.
Zepeda v Zepeda was an action of Joseph Dennis Zepeda, a
minor, by Irma M. Flores, his next friend, against his father for
damages because he had been born an adulterine bastard. The
complaint averred that the defendant, plaintiff's father, induced the
plaintiff's mother to have sexual relations by promising marriage,
such promise being fraudulent because, unbeknown to the mother,
defendant was already married. It was further charged that the
defendant's acts were willful and injured the plaintiff's person,
property, and reputation by causing him to be born an adulterine
bastard. Damages were sought by plaintiff for the deprivation of
his right to be a legitimate child, to have a normal home, to have
a legal father, to inherit from his father, to inherit from his paternal
ancestors, and for being stigmatized as a bastard. The plaintiff
raised constitutional questions under the due process and equal
protection clauses and under Article II, section 19 of the Constitution
of Illinois, which provides that "every person ought to find a certain
remedy m the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive
in his person, property, or reputation;" asked relief on the contract
theory, plaintiff as third party beneficiary of the agreement made
by his father and mother to marry; alleged defamation resulting
7. "We find no reasonable basis, consistent with public policy, for recognition of a
cause of action predicated, first, upon a supposed obligation on the part of the state to
a person to be conceived and, second, upon allegations of damage not susceptible of
ascertainment." [T]he damages asserted rest upon the very fact of conception and would
have to comprehend the infirmities inherent in claimant's situation as against the alternrl-
tive of a void, if non-existence may be thus expressed, and could not, without incursion into
the metaphysical, be measured against the hypothesis of a child or imagined entity in
some way identifiable with claimant but of normal and lawful parentage and possessed
of normal or average advantages." Id. at 787.
8. "[M]ere mental pain and anguish are too vague for legal redress. " Southern
Express Co. v. Byers, 240 US 612 (1916) at 615.
9. The objections that "mental disturbance cannot be measured in terms of money,
and so cannot serve in itself as a basis for the action have been demolished many
times, and it is threshing old straw to deal with them." PROSSER, TORTS, § 55, (3d ed. 1964).
10. 41 IlL App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945, 85 Sip. Ct.
444 (1964).
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in damage to reputation and good name; and endeavored to state
a cause of action for mental suffering. The Circuit Court, Cook
County, entered an order dismissing the suit and striking the com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action. The plaintiff appealed
directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which refused to consider
the case, and transferred it to the Illinois Appellate Court, which
held that the complaint alleged the commission of a tort, but affirmed
its dismissal. The constitutional issues were disposed of by the
refusal of the Illinois Supreme Court to take the case.1
In dealing with the theory of a third party beneficiary to a
contract, the court said: "This contention, even if it were tenable,
is not available to the plaintiff because his complaint sounds in
tort.,,1
2
The allegation of defamation, although the plaintiff's damage in
reputation was similar to that of a defamed person, was also rejected,
because the complaint failed to allege publication. The court also
disposed of the claim made on the basis of intentional infliction of
mental distress, ruling that such tort was not sufficiently alleged.
The court observed that "if [the complaint] did outline such an
action, it would be an interesting speculation whether a charge of
mental distress and emotional suffering could be made and sus-
tained on behalf of an infant."' s
The Appellate Division was less hesitant with respect to the
tortious nature of the defendant's activities. It found that the
defendant's act was willful because of his indifference to the fore-
seeable consequences of his act and complete disregard of the rights
of others, in that he knew that if a child were born as a result of
his act he could not legitimize that child. The criminal aspects of
the act were said to have accentuated its gravity Defendant's act
"was not only a moral wrong but was, under the aggravated cir-
cumstances of this case, tortious in its nature."' 14 The court, however,
refused to recognize the cause of action because to do so would
be judicial lawmaking, which, the justices felt, is improper "where
the result would be as sweeping as here."'' Recognition of a cause
11. "If a case in which constitutional issues are advanced is transferred to the Ap-
pellate Court, it must be concluded that the Supreme Court has determined no such issues
are involved or they are not material to the disposition of the appeal. City of Chicago v.
Campbell, 27 I1. App. 2d 456, 170 N.E.2d 19." Id., 190 N.E.2d at 852.
12. Id., 190 N.E.2d at 852.
13. Id., 190 N.E.2d at 855.
14. Id., 190 N.E.2d at 852. It seems inconsistent for the court to recognize the existence
of a tort and its resultant harm, but refuse an action for damages. It is a well recognized
concept of tort law that for every tort there is a corresponding remedy in damages. "Right
and remedy within the meaning of this rule, are reciprocal, there can be no right without
a remedy, and to deny the remedy, is, in substance, to deny the right." 1 C.J.S. Actions,
§ 4 (1963). See also, PROSSER, TORTS § 1 (2d ed. 1955).
15. "[Lawmiking, while inherent m the judicial process should not be indulged in
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of action for "wrongful life"1 should come, said the court, "only
after thorough study of the consequences. ,,1" Moreover, the
novelty of the action seems to have been a factor contributing to
the Zepeda decision.18 Professor Max Rhemstien, Professor of law
at the University of Chicago, an internationally recognized authority
on family law, was asked by the court in Zepeda, at the suggestion
of plaintiff's attorney,1 to participate in the case as amicus curiae.
The court quoted from Professor Rheinstien's description of the
complaint: "Such a claim is novel. There is no statutory or judicial
recognition of such a claim in Illinois or elsewhere in the United
States. There is no adverse decision either In fact, no such claim
seems ever to have been raised in any court in Illinois or any
Common Law jurisdiction, or in any Civil Law country either "20
In denying the cause of action, the decision reflects the hesitancy
of the court due m part to the novelty of the complaint.
In recognizing the harm and characterizing the act of procreation
of a bastard child as tortious,2 1 however, the Zepeda court presented
arguments in favor of redress for what they felt to be a real
injury, which were convincing enough to guide the New York Court
of Claims in recognizing a cause of action m favor of a bastard in
Williams v State. The Williams Court of Claims decision could
be narrowly construed as affording relief only to a child conceived
and born out of wedlock as a result of an institutional defendant's
failure to protect the child's incompetent mother from sexual assault.
The opinion handed down in that case, however, strongly indicates
that, given the fact situation in Zepeda, it would have recognized
a cause of action in favor of the Zepeda child. The opinion in
Zepeda v Zepeda, stated the Court of Claims, "deviated from its
logical sequence when it concluded that the cause of action had
where the result could be as sweeping as here. The Interest of society is so involved, the
action needed to redress the tort could be so far-reaching, that the policy of the State
should be declared by the representatives of the people." Supra note 10, 190 N.E.2d at
859. Since the law looks with general disfavor upon sexual activity outside of marriage
and since a large segment of society views such conduct as morally reprehensible, no
statutory basis seems necessary to a finding of liability here.
16. "Wrongful life," a rather unfortunate term because its purview goes far beyond
the concept of illegitimacy, is the label applied by the Zepeda court to the tort there in
question. Supra note 10, 190 N.E.2d at 859.
17. Id., 190 N.E.2d at 859.
18. The New York Court of Claims recognized this factor and derided the Zepeda
court for. allowing it to affect their decision, saying, "the novelty and lack of precedent
for declaring that the baby bastard has a cause of action should not be a deterrent to
such ruling." Supra note 1, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
19. Defendant did not contest the appeal, and during the oral argument, the plaintiff's
attorney suggested to the court that the defendent's viewpoint should be represented, and
that Professor Rhienstein be asked to participate.
20. Supra note 10, 190, N.E.2d at 851-52.
21. "Recognition of the plaintiff's claim means creation of a new tort: a cause of
action for wrongful life." Id., 190 N.E.2d at 858.
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to be dismissed rather than establish a new cause of action. ..,22
The combination of arguments and precedent laid out in Zepeda
and in the Court of Claims decision of Williams v State set forth
strong arguments, both legal and social, against allowing the il-
legitimate's plight to exist without legal remedy These arguments
are not properly answered by the Court of Appeals decision. If the
new tort recognized in the Williams case can be committed not
only in the extraordinary circumstances there present, but also by
an illegitimate's father, these arguments must be met and that
tort examined in its relation to other somewhat similar areas of
tort law
The first conceptual problem dealt with by the Williams and
Zepeda courts was whether a tort may be inflicted upon a human
being simultaneously with its conception. The New York Court of
Appeals' dismissal of the problem by referring to the cause of
action as one predicated "upon a supposed obligation on the part
of the State to a person to be conceived," 23 thus not entitled to legal
remedy, in light of the detailed analyses by the other two courts,
is not an adequate answer to the question. In dealing with the
problem the Court of Claims and the Illinois court found analogies
in the pre-natal injury cases.
The case of first impression on the question of recovery by a
child for injuries inflicted upon him prior to his birth was Dietrzch
V Inhabitants of Northampton,24 where the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, in an opinion written by Oliver Wendell Holmes,
held, "if a woman between four and five months advanced in
pregnancy, by reason of falling upon a defective highway, is delivered
of a child, who survives his premature birth only a few minutes,
such a child is not a 'person', within the meaning of the Pub. Sts.
c. 52,§17, for the loss of whose life an action may be maintained
against the town by his admmistrator." 25 The opinion further stated,
"as the unborn child was a part of the mother at the tine of the
injury, any damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered
for at all was recoverable by her [the mother] ... .
The next jurisdiction in the United States to handle the problem
was Illinois, in the 1900 case of AllaLre v St. Luke's Hospital.
21
In that case the court, following the reasoning in Dietrzch, held
that an infant cannot maintain an action for injuries received
22. Supra note 1, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
23. Supra note 7.
24. 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. St. Rep. 242 (1884).
25. Id. at 14.
26. Id. at 17.
27. 184 Il. 359, 56 N.E. 638, 45 L.R.A. 225 (1900).
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before birth.28  Justice Boggs, however, dissenting, expressed a
viewpoint which was to find acceptance later He stated that:
the law should, it seems to me, be that whenever a child
zn utero is so far advanced in pre-natal age as that, should
parturition by natural or artificial means occur at such age,
such child could and would live separable from the mother
and grow into the ordinary activities of life, and is after-
ward born and becomes a living human being, such child
has a right of action for any injuries wantonly or negligently
inflicted upon his or her person at such age of viability,
though then in the womb of the mother 29
The precedent set in Dietrich and Allare ruled the decisions
for nearly fifty years.30 The courts, in denying recovery, grounded
their decisions on lack of precedents for recovery,
31 stare decisis,3 2
the conjectural and speculative nature of the injury,3 3 lack of duty
owed to the child,8 4 and fear of ficticious claims. 35 There was,
however, growing opposition to the doctrine.36 As well as the dissent
in Allaire, the rationale was questioned by Justice Cardozo in a
dissenting opinion in Drobner v Peters,37 and by Brogan, C. J et al
in a strong dissent in Stemmer v Kline.3 8 But only one decision in
this country rejected the rule prior to 1946. A Pennsylvania trial
court, in a 1924 case, decided not to be bound by the weight of
authority and granted relief for injuries wrongfully inflicted upon a
child prior to its birth.39 This case must be considered overruled,
28. "That a child before birth is m fact, a part of the mother, and is only severed
from her at birth, cannot, we think be successfully disputed. The doctrine of the civil
law and the ecclesiastical and admiralty court, therefore, that an unborn child may be
regarded as in esse for some purposes, when for its benefit, is a mere legal fiction, which
so far as we have been able to discover, has not been indulged in by the courts of
common law to the extent of allowing an action by an infant for injuries occasioned before
its birth. If the action can be maintained, it necessarily follows that an infant may main-
tam an action against its own mother while pregnant with it. We are of the opinion that
the action will not lie." Id., 56 N.E. a t 640.
29. Id., 56 N.E. at 642.
30. Stanford v. St. Louis-San Franciso Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926),
See Buel v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W 71 (1913), Drobner v.
Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921), Mays v. Wemgarten, 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ct. App.
Ohio, 1943), Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordon, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944
(1935), Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric R. and Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W 916 (1916).
31. See Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, supra note 27.
32. See Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939).
33. See Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., Supra note 30.
34. See Allaire, Supra note 27.
35. See Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, Supra note 30.
36. Morris, Injuries to Infants "En Ventre Sa Mere", 59 CENT. L.J. 143 (1904) Kerr,
Actions by Unborn Infant, 61 CENT. L.J. 364 (1905) Albertsworth, Recognition of Now
Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 CALIF. L. REV. 461 (1922), Frey, Injuries to Infants "En
Ventre Sa Mere", 12 ST. LOUIS L. REv. 85 (1927) Notes, 76 CENT, L.J. 351 (1913) 34
HARV. L. REV. 549 (1921) 6 CORNELL L. Q. 341 (1921) 44 YALE L.J. 1468 (1935) 20
MINN. L. R v. 121 (1936), and 36 Micn. L. REv. 512 (1938).
37. Supra note 30.
38. 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942).
39. See discussion of Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227, supra note 10, 190 N.E.2d
at 853.
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however, by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Berlin v J. C.
Penney Co."
The breakthrough in the United States finally came in the District
Court of the U.S. for the District of Columbia, where m Bonbrest
v Kotz4' it was held that a child who was injured in the process
of removal from its mother's womb by defendant's alleged profes-
sional malpractice, and which demonstrated its capacity at the
time of the injury to survive, by surviving, was a "viable child,
' 42
and a person having standing in court to maintain an action for
its injury, and could not be denied recovery on the ground that it
was merely a part of the mother. The court distinguished Dtetrtch
v Inhabitants of Northampton on the basis of viability existing in
the case of the Bonbrest child at the time of the injury
The ruling in Bonbrest led the courts in many jurisdictions in
overruling prior decisions and granting relief to infants for injuries
prior to birth.
4 3
The Court of Appeals of Georgia, in 1955, in Porter v Lassiter"
dispensed with the viability test. The court there held that it was
sufficient if the foetus was "quick," and that it was not essential
for the foetus to have reached the viable stage. Many courts have
since gone further and declared that a recovery may be had for
pre-natal injuries inflicted upon infants at points of time ever nearer
the moment of conception, irrespective of the stage of development
of the foetus. 5 There are some jurisdictions in which decisions
denying recovery for pre-natal injuries do not appear to have been
overruled, 4 6 but the trend toward recognizing the injury and allowing
compensation in the courts seems clear In Zepeda the Illinois Court,
after referring to the history and development of the cause of
action for pre-natal injury, concluded, "if recovery is permitted an
infant injured one month after conception, why not if injured one
week after, one minute after, or at the moment of conception? It
40. 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940).
41. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
42. There is a medical distinction between the "embryo" and the "viable" foetus. The
"embryo refers to the foetus in the early stages of the development, and the foetus is
referred to as "viable" when it is sufficiently developed to live outside of the womb.
STEOMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, ILLUSTRATED 1640 (20th ed. 1961).
43. Amann v. Faidy, 415 111. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953) overruling Allaire v. St.
Lukes Hospital, note 27 supra, Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951),
overruling Drobner v. Peters, note 37 supra, Smith v. Brennen, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497
(1960), overruling Stemmer v. Kline, note 38 supra, Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164
A.2d 93 (1960), overruling Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., note 40 supra.
44. 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955).
45. E.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956),
second month Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961), first month
Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953), third month of pregnancy,
Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960), first month of pregnancy.
46. See Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., supra note 30, Gorman v. Budlong,
23 R.I. 169. 49 At. 704 (1901), Turnknett v. Keaton, 266 F.2d 572 (5th cir. 1959).
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is inevitable that the date will be further retrogressed.' '47 The law
of property has long recognized the legal existence of a child from
the moment of conception, and it would seem that tort law has at
last come to that position.
The possibility of non-existence of the injured person at the time
of the commission of the act which is deemed to have caused the
injury, as is the case where the illegitimate's conception takes place
some time after completion of the act of intercourse, was recognized
by the Williams and Zepeda courts. They alluded to Piper v Hoard4s,
in which a child was awarded the fruits of a contract made for
her benefit prior to her birth,49 but dismissed the entire argument
by describing a child not yet conceived at the time of completion
of the act as a potential being having such an essential reality as
to be considered in being at the time of the act which created its
existence.5
0
Both the New York Court of Claims and the Zepeda court un-
qualifiedly recognized the existence of a real harm inherent in the
status of the illegitimate. "[I]t would be a pure fiction to say that
the plaintiff suffers no injury.
51
Children born illegitimate have suffered an injury If legiti-
mation does not take place, the injury is continuous. If
legitimation cannot take place, the injury is irrepairable.
The injury is not as tangible as a physical defect but it is
as real. This is acknowledged by the State itself. The statu-
tory provision that a child's illegitimacy must be suppressed
in certain public records is an admission of the hardships
that can be caused by its disclosure. How often during his
life does an illegitimate try to conceal his parentage and
how often does he wince in shame when it is revealed?
Public opinion may bring about more laws ameliorating
further his legal status, but laws cannot temper the cruelty
of those who hurl the epithet "bastard" nor ease the bitter-
47. Supra note 10, 190 N.E.2d at 853.
48. 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (Ct. App. 1887).
49. In that case, the defendant, John L. Hoard, had promised to the mother of the
plaintiff that if she married Frederick Piper, the issue of that marriage would receive
a substantial portion of land, which had been conveyed to the defendant by Frederick Piper.
The marriage was consumated, and plaintiff, the only issue of said marriage, brought
the action against Hoard for deliverance of the property. The court held that the facts
alleged in the complaint constituted a fraud upon plaintiff's mother, upon which plaintiff
had a right of action, and that defendant could be held to the character of trusted
ex maleficto in plaintiff's favor, and as such was bound to make good to her/his repre-
sentations. Ibid.
50. "[If the plaintiff was conceived before the completion of the act he became a
living, human organism concurrently with the wrongful act. If his conception took place
after the act, he was a potential being with essential reality at the time of the act. The
seed was planted, the life process was started, life ensued, and birth followed. The de-
fendant's wrongful act simultaneously procreated the being whom it injured." Supra note
10, 190 N.E.2d at 855.
51. 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 at 958 (1965) supra note 10, 190 N.E.2d at 857.
at 857.
NOTES
ness of him who hears it, knowing it to be true. This, how-
ever, is but one phase, one manifestation of the basic injury,
which is being born and remaining illegitimate. An illegiti-
mate's very birth places him under a disability 52
As a portion of that harm, the plaintiff in Zepeda complained
that defendant's negligent act deprived him of the normal home
that might have been his and of equality with the legitimate child
he might have been. The court rejected this element of the alleged
harm, however, because they felt to do so would be to give an
illegitimate child rights superior to those of a legitimate, in that
a legitimate child cannot maintain an action against his parents
for lack of affection, for failure to provide a pleasant home, for
disrupting the family life or for being responsible for a divorce
which has broken up the home.53
A legitimate child, however, has been recognized by the courts
as having certain of these rights to love and affection and an
undisturbed family life.5 4 Some jurisdictions allow a legitimate child
a cause of action analogous to that of a wife for alienation of
affections. 5' In Johnson v Luhman,5 5 an action by five minor chil-
dren against Lydia Luhman for alienation of the affections of their
father and depriving them of his support and society when she
enticed the father to desert his wife and family, the court granted
the children a cause of action against Luhman for destroying their
family unit, to enforce their "right to protect their relationships
with their parents. ,,57 The opinion defined as rights to which
children are entitled as incidental to their family life not only such
things as food and shelter, but such intangibles as affection, moral
support and guidance, as well.53
Also, impressive arguments which have been put to the court
advocating recognition of a cause of action in favor of an infant for
loss of consortium of his parents, although accepted in only one
case, led one writer to conclude: "We shall wait patiently, perhaps
a good while, but we shall see that court in our day which will
exercise its judicial empiricism and allow recovery in an area
52. Id., 260 N.Y.S.2d at 958, 190 N.E.2d at 857.
53. Supra note 10, 190 N.E.2d at 856.
54. "[A] legitimate child has the natural right to be wanted, loved, and cared for.
He also has an Interest in preserving his family life 'and he may protect this Interest
against outside disturbances." From Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d
810 (1947) , Id., 190 N.E.2d at 856.
55. See Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945), Johnson v. Luhman, supra
note 47 Heck v. Schupp, 394 fll. 296, 68 N.E.2d (1946) Miller v. Monson, 228 Minn.
400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949).
56. 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947).
57. Id., 71 N.E.2d at 814.
58. "Children are entitled to both the tangible incidents of family life such as food,
clothing and shelter and to the intangible elements of affection, moral support and
guidance from both parents. AlU members of a family have a right to protect the family
relationships. " Ibid.
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where the reasons for its denial have ceased to exist." 59 Thus, the
rationale of refusing to redress this harm inherent in illegitimacy
because to do so would give the illegitimate rights superior to those
of a legitimate child, is not completely convincing. The situation
of the illegitimate must be distinguished from that of the legitimate
child in an unhappy home. The legitimate may have, at least in
some cases, the right to parental affection, happy family life, and
a whole family unit. Even though the legitimate child does not have
an absolute right to a happy home life, he is not in the same position
as is the illegitimate, as the illegitimate has been deprived of even
the chance to have such a home with his natural parents because
of his illegitimacy
The plaintiffs in Williams and Zepeda further sought damages
for the deprivation of the right to inherit from their fathers and
from their paternal ancestors. The Zepeda court notes that legis-
lation has taken steps toward alleviating that disability of the il-
legitimate,60 but that, "praiseworthy as this legislation is it does
not, and no law can, make these children whole." 61 Here is where
the reluctance to put the illegitimate child in a better position than
the legitimate child could, in most cases, be appropriately applied.
There is no "right" inherent in any status of a child to Inherit
from anyone. 2 There are, of course, statutes in some jurisdictions
which provide for children of the deceased born after the execution
of the deceased's will in the event that they are not mentioned in
the will. Generally, however, a child may be disinherited. Even if
this were not so, it must be remembered that the majority of the
populace do not accumulate any wealth during their lifetimes, and
thus have nothing to pass on to their children. To allow damages
to the illegitimate because of loss of inheritance as an absolute
right would truly be discrimination against legitimates. Here again,
the legitimate may not have an absolute right, but he does have
a chance to inherit from his father and paternal ancesotrs, and the
illegitimate, by virtue of his status, has been deprived of that chance.
It is inconsistent for the courts to recognize the harm in the instance
of loss of inheritance and not recognize it in the case of deprivation
of a happy home life. If the loss of that chance in either is a real
59. Comment, Loss of Consortium-A Child's Action For, 2 J. FAM. LAW 51 (1962).
60. "Under the common law an illegitimate child could not inherit. r1In recent
years a more compassionate sense of social justice has brought about the enactment of
beneficlent legislation which has alleviated some of the oppression long, visited up these
unfortunates." 41 fI1. App.2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 at 851, 856 (1963).
61. Id., 190 N.E.2d at 857.
62. 49 American jurisdictions treat legitimate and illegitimate children in the same
manner with respect to inheritance rights from the mother. Nineteen states allow the
illegitimate a right of inheritance from the father, at least where there is acknowledgment
of paternity. See Note, 26 BaooMLN L. REv. 45 (1959-1960).
NOTES
harm, the loss of that chance in both should be, notwithstanding
the difficulty in assessing damages in both cases.
The remaining aspect of harm alleged was that of being
"stigmatized a bastard." Both courts showed convincingly that the
law has recognized and sought to alleviate some of the disability
under which illegitimates suffer 68 The Zepeda court referred to the
statutory provisions in Illinois which are directed at lessening the
burden of the illegitimate: The child is allowed his father's surname,
may compel payment for support and education from either or
both parents, may be legitimized by subsequent marriage of the
parents, is considered legitimate if born of a void marriage; and
the child's attainment of the status of legitimacy is facilitated by
the waiving of various procedures, lack of which could prevent the
marriage of the parents.'
Since illegitimates have been the beneficiaries of remedial
humanitarian statutes designed to remove some of the burdens of
their status, it seemed clear to both courts that the law had
recognized the harm which attaches to that status. From that, it
followed in the Court of Claims that the illegitimate could recover
from the agency which had harmed him by producing that status, to
compensate him for that harm. In Zepeda, however, the court re-
frained from doing so, and referred the plaintiff to the legislature
for his remedy
Since statutes have at least in part taken care of most of the
economic burden of the illegitimate, the major element compensated
by the New York Court of Claims must have been the psychological
harm. That harm can be most closely analogized to that suffered
by the victim of intentional infliction of mental or emotional dis-
tress.65 It must be noted that mental disturbance is compensated
in many jurisdictions only when "parasitic" to some other injury 66
Many cases may be cited as at least recognizing the rule that there
is no right of recovery for mental or emotional distress alone,
unconnected with any independently actionable tort or with a con-
temporaneous or consequential physical injury 67 Even where the
63. "Under the common law an Illegitimate child was called 'fillus nullius' son of
no one, or 'filtus populus' son of the people. [Citation omitted] His position In the com-
munity was one of Ignominy and he had no rights In law. Since he was the child of no
one he was without a name his parents had no right to his custody and no subsequent
aet of theirs could make his legitimate, only a special act of parliament could do so.
[Citation omitted] In most American Jurisdictions Illegitimate children were also treated
harshly, but in recent years the whole climate has changed nationally, with variations
In degree from state to state. [Citation omitted] More euphonious terms are also being
used In the statutes. 'Bastard' Is giving way to Illegitimate child' 'Bastardy Acts' have
yielded to 'Pamily Acts' and 'Paternity Acts'" ,.pra note 10, 190 N.E.2d at 856.
64. Id., 190 N.E.2d at 856.
65. See Peosss, Toa'rs, § 55 (3d ed. 1964).
66, 64 A.L.R.2d 115.
67. See, e.g., Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), State Rubbish
Collector's Assn. v. Silienoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
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infliction of mental distress is intentional or reckless, or where
any reasonable man would have known that such would result,
the growing trend toward recognition of an independent right of
recovery has not been universally accepted61 Furthermore, the
courts recognizing liability where the mental distress is not parasitic
to other injuries, have done so only where the defendant's conduct
has been extreme and outrageous. It has not been enough that the
defendant has acted with a tortious or even criminal intent, or
that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his
conduct has been malicious. 9 It is submitted that, unless the harm
being compensated in the Williams decision can be properly dis-
tinguished from that in mental distress cases, or the elements of
loss of chance to have a happy home and to inherit are included
as accompanying injuries, this, rather than an unwillingness to
assess a dollar value to damages, could be a rather convincing
argument against recognition of the tort.
The next area with which the Zepeda court dealt was that of
the possible flood of litigation likely to result from the recognition
of a cause of action for "wrongful birth." The opinion refers to the
great number of illegitimate births in the United States and their
ever increasing incidence. 70 Although the opinion expressly denies
that the possibility of great numbers of actions arising from a
decision for the plaintiff in this case is the reason for its denying
recovery,7 1 their concern in this area may have been a factor in
the decision.7 2 It is of interest to note that here again the develop-
ment of tort law has historically been impeded by the same fear,78
but has continued to develop in spite of temporary setbacks because
of it. The fear of the Zepeda Court of a flood of litigation from
68. Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 115 PROSSER, TORTS § 11 at 51 (3d ed. 1964).
69. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 46, Comment d (1965).
70. "If the new litigation were confined just to Illegitimates it would be formidable.
In 1960 there were 224,330 illegitimate births in the United State, 14,262 in Illinois and
10,182 in Chicago. Vital Statistics of the United States, 1960, Vol. 1 Sec. 1, 2 (1962). Not
only are there more such births year after year (In Illinois and in Chicago the number
in 1960 was twice that of 1950) but the ratio between illegitimate and legitimate births
is increasing. This increase is attested by a report of the Illinois Department of 'Public
Health, released in July, 1962. This report revealed that In Chicago in 1961, of the 87,989
live births 11,021 were illegitimate, a ratio of eight to one. In 1951 out of 81,801 births,
5,212 were illegitimate, a ratio of fifteen to one." 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 at
858 (1963).
71. "That the doors of litigation would be opened wider might make us proceed
cautiously in approving a new action, but it would not deter us. The plaintiffs claim
cannot be rejected because there may be others of equal merit. It is not the suits of
illegitimates which give us concern, great in numbers as these may be." 1d., 190 N.E.2d
at 858.
72. The Williams court felt that the uepeda decision had wrongfully dismissed the ac-
tion "rather than establish a new cause of action whereby the 'doors of litigation would be
opened wider " 46 Misc.2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 at 958 (1965).
73. See Spade v. Lynn and B.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) Sullivan v.
H. P Hood and Sons, 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d 80 (1960) Roberson v. Rochester Fold-
Ing Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902) GREEN, JUDGE AND Jua 85-87 (1930).
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children born of artificial insemination,14 depends for its relevance
as a threat to the courts on the future dealings of the legislatures
concerning the legitimacy of a child so conceived. As already noted,
the law has a tender regard for legitimacy, and several cases acting
on the question, have held that husband and wife, having once
consented to artificial insemination, are estopped from later deny-
ing that a child conceived from the heterological artificial insemi-
nation is not the child of their marriage, if it is in the best interests
of the child.
7 5
Children born of heterologous insemination should not be
stigmatized with illegitimacy when the husbands of their
mothers had freely consented to the practice which resulted
in their birth and had permitted their names to be registered
as fathers. . . .The solution to the problem . is simple,
and requires only legislative recognition that such children
are legitimate.76
The possibility of complications in one area of law due to lack
of proper treatment in the future by the legislative and judicial
systems in a second area of the law, should not be a deterrent for
judicial advancement in the first.
Next the court in Zepeda v Zepeda speculated on the "nature
of the new action and the related suits which would be encouraged.
'7
It was feared that a decision granting relief for injuries suffered
by an illegitimate for the stigma attached to his bastardy would
lead to actions by everyone born into the world under conditions
less than ideal. "One might seek damages for being born of a
certain color, another because of race; one for being born with a
hereditary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate family char-
acteristics; one for being born into a large and destitute family,
another because a parent has an unsavory reputation. ' 7 8 These
fears could be easily dispelled by recognizing that there is no social
or moral wrong inherent in marital sex. Procreation is not tortious
unless it is extra-marital or adulterous. The tort of "wrongful birth"
74. "The present case could be Just a forerunner of those which may confront the
courts in the future. Without stimulating them, we may have suits for wrongful life
just as we now have for wrongful death. Cases are appearing in the domestic relations
field concerning children born as a result of artificial insemination. [Citation ommitted]
How long will it be before a child so produced sues In tort those responsible for its being?"
41 Ill. App.2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 at 858 (1963).
75. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 208 Misc. 633, 143 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1955), People v.
Dennett, 15 Mlsc.2d 260, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1958).
76. Biskind, Legitimacy of Children Born by Artificial Insemination, 5 J. FAM. LAW
39 (1965).
77. 41 ill. App.2d 249, 190 N.E.2d 849 at 858 (1963).
78. Id., 190 N.E.2d at 858.
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cannot exist in the conception by a husband and a wife of a child
thus born legitimate.
The Williams court, m recognizing the cause of action, merely
followed the Zepeda reasoning to the point at which that court denied
recovery, denounced the reluctance of the Illinois court, and granted
relief. Although it is true that a court's decision should properly
be restricted to the issues presented in the particular case before
it, the creation of a novel right of action, in this case a new tort,
requires thoughtful consideration of the ramifications of the decision,
and careful definition and explanation of the elements of the act
for which the court is granting relief. A number of problems likely
to arise were not adequately provided for by the decisions.
How, for instance, is the amount of damage to be ascertained?
The defendant has, by the same act which resulted in the child's
illegitimate status, given the child life, although not under the most
satisfactory circumstances. Here, then, is a tort which, at the same
time it is inflicting an injury on the plaintiff, confers upon him a
notable benefit. Is the benefit of life to be weighed by the jury
against the harm of illegitimacy) Would a court, instructing other-
wise, be in effect saying that non-existence is preferable to existence
as an illegitimate? It is possible that there are some people, due
to situations of great pam or constant suffering, who would prefer
death to life. This is indicated by the incidence of suicide in this
country and throughout the world. In all probability, however, most
illegitimates value their existence even as a "bastard" highly
enough to prefer it over non-existence. It would be a most difficult
task to persuade a jury that a plaintiff-illegitimate preferred non-
existence to existence, even under his circumstances. The court
could, as a matter of policy, declare that the value intrinsic in
life is not to be considered in determining the compensation of the
illegitimate, and thus provide for an award of greater than nominal
damages. To dismiss the damage as impossible of ascertainment
as did the Appellate division, is not an adequate answer if indeed
harm exists, and the opinions of the Court of Claims and the
Illinois court do not provide a sufficient guide for the triers of fact.
It should also be noted that the requirement set down in Zepeda
of defendant's being "completely indifferent to the foreseeable con-
sequences of his act,"' 9 seems to imply the requirement of a
negligent or reckless state of mind. The Zepeda court seems to say
that the defendant may be charged as a matter of law with
knowledge that conception would result, and that as he knew as an
79. Id., 190 N.E.2d at 852.
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adulterer that he could not legitimize the child, he could foresee
the stigma that the child would suffer Recovery for merely negligent
infliction of emotional distress is rare.80 Does this excuse a defendant
who, exercising due care, practiced birth control, or who, intending
to marry his partner, did not foresee the illegitimacy of his offspring?
Could the child sue his mother also, if she was negligent, willful,
and disregarded foreseeable consequences, as would be the case
of a careless prostitute or willing lover 9 What of the mother who
refuses all of the father's honest attempts to marry? A suit against
the mother might fall within the doctrine of parental immunity, if
the child was in the custody of the mother, but probably would
not if he were in someone else's care.
It could be inferred that the defendant is excused if the damage,
the "stigma" is removed by subsequent marriage. If so, is there a
duty to marry9 Before such a duty is created, the court should
consider the social consequences of judicially sanctioned marriages
without love, and, in the case of an adulterous relationship, the
breakdown of an already existing marriage necessitated by the
avoidance of suit. And, if the cause of action is removed by sub-
sequent marriage, it is easily arguable that legitimation be written
recognition of the father, or by subsequent adoption of the child,
also deprives the child of his right to sue in tort. What of the child
who finds that the date of his birth is prior to the wedding date of
his parents. Can he too recover for the distress he suffers as a
result of that knowledge?
Thus, many questions and possibilities have been left open
by the decisions on the tort of infliction of illegitimacy It is sub-
mitted that most of these could be settled by a more careful
definition of the tort, narrowing it in scope to the concept of il-
legitimacy, or by a decision which disallows the tort by more
decisively refuting the arguments in its favor than did the opinion
of the Appellate division. Judicial reasoning has shown that an
illegitimate suffers from a very real harm which absent this cause
of action would go in part unredressed, and since there is a strong
social policy against extra-marital sex, especially when it results
m the birth of an illegitimate child, the courts should hold the person
responsible for inflicting that harm liable in damages to the injured
child, or refuse to do so with reasoning at least as convincing as
that which created the tort.
80. See text accompanying note 70 4nfra.
